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ABSTRACT  
 
Previous research has considered how exploratory market learning processes moderate 
market and technological uncertainty in radical product development. Scholars argue that 
new product development (NPD) teams may increase the chances of success of radically new 
projects by acquiring, assimilating and implementing new information from market feedback. 
However, research has not tackled how information is assimilated by the NPD team and to 
what extent the process of information implementation occurs.  In this article, we begin to fill 
the need for such research by investigating the interaction between internal team values 
(beliefs and possibly ideology) and external market feedback / information in radical projects.  
Via the lens of a 2-year longitudinal participant-observation study, we suggest that 
information assimilation is not automatic, but rather influenced in interesting ways by 
internal team values. The findings imply that shared team values act as a selective 
assimilation mechanism determining whether a development team will act on user feedback.  
Furthermore, the type of information (e.g., functional vs. conceptual feedback) processed by 
the development team acts as a moderating factor on the relationship between the team values 
and information processing. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Radical innovation is thought to be an uncertain process because radical projects entail new 
concerns and unclear performance criteria upon which managers must base their decisions 
(March, 1991). To reduce market and technological uncertainty, scholars advocate 
exploratory learning and market orientation processes because they help managers better 
understand latent customer needs (Slater & Narver, 1995) while experimenting with new 
technologies (Yli-Renko, Autio, & Sapienza, 2001).  Exploratory learning processes entail 
collecting and using new information that departs from the firm‘s skills and knowledge, 
while exploitative learning builds on the firm‘s current knowledge (Atuahene-Gima & 
Murray, 2007; March, 1991). 
Scholars have predicted that the search and acquisition of this new information and 
other practices related to exploratory learning process increase the speed and the chances of 
success of new product development (NPD) projects (Lynn, Morone, & Paulson, 1996; Lynn, 
Skov, & Abel, 1999). They argue that by acquiring, disseminating, and implementing the 
new information (Kohli & Jaworski, 1990; Sinkula, 1994; Slater et al., 1995), managers and 
NPD teams are able to learn faster and more efficiently with positive implications for project 
performance (Lynn et al., 1996). 
However, in spite of the extensive research on exploratory learning processes, current 
theories overlook two important issues.  First, existing theories assume that the ability to 
maximize learning by managers and NPD teams depends largely on the quality and quantity 
of information acquired. When the information is acquired, disseminated and assimilated, the 
NPD team will implement it, with beneficial effects for the NPD project. This ―deterministic‖ 
perspective omits the possibility that the process of information acquisition, dissemination, 
assimilation and implementation may work in different and distinctive ways, where much of 
the information acquired may not necessarily be disseminated or implemented.  In other 
words, what is missing in extant research is an investigation on why certain information is 
assimilated by the organization and to what extent the process of information implementation 
occurs. 
 Second, existing research overlooks the role of team values, commitment, and indeed 
ideology as moderating factors in the process of information assimilation.  For the sake of 
simplicity, we refer to the above as team values throughout this article. The extent to which 
managers and project teams benefit from new market and technology information depends 
not only on their competences in collecting, integrating and assimilating the information 
acquired along the NPD project, but also their values. Few studies have investigated the 
interaction between internal team values and external market feedback and information in 
radical projects. 
 The aim of this paper is to address these very issues in discussing how the exploratory 
market learning process occurs and evolves by disentangling three distinct pieces of a market 
learning framework (i.e., acquisition, dissemination, and implementation). Here ―exploratory 
market learning‖ is defined as the process through which new information about latent 
customer needs and technological changes affecting those needs are acquired and assimilated 
during NPD projects (O'Connor, 1998). The unit of analysis is a radically new product 
project, where team members acquire, share and implement new information for the NPD 
project.  This unit of analysis is extremely relevant for market learning, because it captures 
the particularities of exploratory market learning processes. As our focus is on the project and 
team level, our exploratory market learning framework assumes that the team members fully 
share and disseminate every piece of information acquired. Therefore, our analysis on 
exploratory market learning focuses mainly on information acquisition and information 
implementation.  
Consistent with the area of inquiry, this research employs a participant-observation 
approach to examine one NPD project, the Mitka project, in which a Dutch consortium 
developed a new human- and electric-propelled three-wheeled vehicle. The Mitka case study 
is illuminating. The project team was strongly motivated to develop and implement a 
radically new, environmentally friendly vehicle as a substitute for the car for commuters in 
the Netherlands. They believed that only acquiring and collecting new information through 
sophisticated market techniques — such as scenario building with what they called ―lead 
users‖ and experts — could lead to understanding latent customer needs and technological 
challenges. Contrary to generally accepted predictions of theory in this area, despite the rich 
amount of information acquired and the practices implemented, often the NPD team decided 
not to assimilate market feedback and not to implement that feedback in the project solutions. 
Indeed, the Mitka development was a story of contradictions reflecting the idiosyncrasy of 
the exploratory market learning process. 
To explore these contradictions, we begin by reviewing the most relevant literature on 
exploratory market learning and market information processing in radical product definition. 
Then, we discuss challenges that NPD teams face when pursuing exploratory market 
learning. After our exploration of how the Mitka team coped with these challenges, we 
propose some insights on exploratory market learning processes. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The development of new business and product lines based on radical innovation is critical for 
the renewal of an organization‘s competitive position (McDermott & O'Connor, 2002) and 
for its long-term survival (March, 1991). Undertaking a radical innovation process means that 
the organization copes with a new and unfamiliar domain (Downs & Mohr, 1976), where 
different technical and business skills are required. 
 Previous research has studied radical innovation focusing on two levels of analysis: 
organizational and project. At the organizational level, scholars emphasize how important it 
is for firms to undertake radical innovation projects together with regular, incremental 
innovation projects (March, 1991). Other researchers have focused on the organizational 
structure required for undertaking radical innovation (Dougherty, 1990), the way firms 
organize their activities for new products (Leifer, O'Connor, & Rice, 2001; O'Connor & 
Veryzer, 2001), strategy (McDermott et al., 2002), market orientation (Atuahene-Gima, 
1995) as well as the extent to which organizational structure may become a barrier for an 
effective venture (Dougherty, 1992). 
At the project level, scholars have examined radical innovation processes and 
differences between incremental and radical innovation. In general, radical innovation 
processes involve a higher degree of technological uncertainty (Schon, 1967), longer 
development time (Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt, & Lyman, 1990), ‗unconventional‘ progression 
of activities (Veryzer, 1998: 317), and different market practices (O'Connor, 1998).  Other 
authors combine the two levels, emphasizing how radical project development should 
proceed by having an external and internal mix of information, organizational structure and 
(human) resources (Atuahene-Gima, 2003; Sheremata, 2000).  
 Although research stresses the uncertainty that managers face performing radical 
innovation, it seems that few studies have examined how managers make use of information 
at hand about the market and technology in the radical product definition stage. This is a 
particularly difficult task, as what is known as ―market orientation‖ (see below) is less 
effective for radical innovation (Atuahene-Gima, 1995). In the two next sections we 
investigate the process of information processing from two complementary perspectives: 
exploratory market learning and market orientation. 
 
The exploratory market learning perspective 
 To better understand market and technological uncertainty, new ventures employ 
exploratory market learning as a process of market information processing (Atuahene-Gima 
et al., 2007). Exploratory market learning is defined as the process of acquiring new 
information and knowledge about customers and technology that departs from current skills 
and knowledge. It focuses on finding out and addressing latent customer needs and new 
technological opportunities (Slater et al., 1995). In this study, our concept of exploratory 
market learning is based on prior research in which learning involves a three-stage process 
that includes information acquisition; information dissemination; shared interpretation and 
implementation (Kohli et al., 1990; Sinkula, 1994; Slater et al., 1995). Let us discuss the 
market learning concept specifically related to exploratory market learning. 
The first stage is information acquisition. During a radical NPD project, the team is 
able to collect, record, review, and file new information as a first stage of the market learning 
process (Lynn et al., 1999). This stage involves several practices and activities that allow 
firms to observe and even work together with lead users using sophisticated market methods, 
such as scenario building, experimenting with new technologies, and information acquisition 
from key customers (Yli-Renko et al., 2001). The second stage is information dissemination, 
where each piece of information is disseminated throughout the team and the organization, 
which might use it or iteratively develop questions (Glazer, 1991). Most scholars in this 
domain have focused on how to effectively share and assimilate the information flow and 
how to encourage information sharing in the development process. The emphasis is on the 
information flow that, if shared effectively, will increase the quality of the information 
gathered (Slater et al., 1995). 
The final stage of the market learning process is the shared interpretation of the 
information where the consensus of the meaning of the information is shared within the 
organization, while minimizing conflicts. The information then is implemented and used in 
the NPD process. It is believed that the quality of the information shared by the team 
members would be a critical step toward the success of NPD partnerships (Mohr & Spekman, 
1994). 
In the NPD literature, much research focuses on information acquisition and, 
eventually, its relation with performance. For example, O‘Connor (1998) studies to what 
extent practices are different in exploratory and exploitative market learning. She finds that, 
among others, multifunctional teams, working with customers as development partners, and 
―visioning‖ processes are practices that promote market learning (O'Connor, 1998). 
Examining team learning patterns in 13 case studies, Lynn (1998) argues that the most 
effective team learning in radical NPD occurs with the formation of an autonomous group 
with adequate authority and resources. The team members need to have relevant technical 
backgrounds and perspectives and able to interact intensively with lead users.  
Empirical evidence shows that exploratory market learning influences NPD 
performance. By analyzing new technology ventures in China, Athuatene-Gima (Attuahene-
Gima, 2005) finds that under conditions of technological uncertainty, exploratory market 
learning is positively related to firm performance. Within the market learning framework, 
Lynn, Reilly and Akgun (2000), by studying 281 NPD projects, find that information 
acquisition and information implementation positively influence NPD performance. Other 
studies show that various market learning practices and information implementation 
influence NPD performance (Akgun, Lynn, & Yilmaz, 2006; Lynn et al., 1999) and the speed 
of NPD projects (Lynn et al., 1999). One aspect of this research stream that so far has 
remained underexplored is why only some stages of market learning influence NPD, while 
others do not seem to be significant. For example, some of the above-mentioned studies do 
not find evidence of the effects of information acquisition (Lynn et al., 1999) and information 
dissemination (Akgun et al., 2006) on NPD performance. Nevertheless, Akgun et al. (2006) 
suggest that information acquisition and assimilation indirectly influence NPD performance 
through the mediating role of information implementation. In other words, they argue that 
NPD team members reduce project uncertainty by implementing market information after 
being acquired and assimilated during the project. In this way, the team achieves better 
decisions, thereby increasing NPD success.  
 
The market orientation perspective 
Together with the market learning literature, the market orientation literature has a rich 
tradition in understanding what market information needs to be acquired and finally 
implemented during the NPD process. These two bodies of literature share many elements 
(Sinkula, 1994). Like the exploratory market learning approach, market orientation involves 
three steps: market information (or market intelligence) generation, dissemination, and 
information use (Kohli et al., 1990; Sinkula, 1994), which are closely related to information 
acquisition, dissemination, and shared interpretation as discussed above. Unlike the 
exploratory market learning approach, the use of information acquired has had a great deal of 
scholarly attention. Deshpande and Zaltman (1982, 1984) focus on the extent to which 
managers use market research that has been solicited. They find that the quality of the report 
and the confirmatory research purpose is associated with an increased use of market 
information. They do not, however, investigate whether the information included in the report 
is fully or partially used. In a conceptual article, Menon and Veradarajan (1992) suggest that 
the likelihood of using market information depends on the manager‘s prior disposition toward 
new information. They suggest that ―managers that are negatively predisposed toward a study 
are likely to use the information in an incongruous action-oriented manner‖ (p. 67). Their 
study focuses on the type of market research study rather than on a specific ―piece‖ of market 
information. Later works seem to test this proposition in an indirect way. For example, 
Jaworski and Kohli (1993) find that when top managers place a great deal of importance on 
market information they are more likely to acquire and use it.  Maltz and Kohli (1996) take 
this a step further and focus on the extent to which managers use pieces of market 
information and consequentially make and implement decisions upon it. They find that the 
use of information acquired depends on the quality of the information perceived by the 
manager.  
A more recent work by Veldhuizen et al. (2006) attempts to cast light on the 
relationship between market information processes and NPD performance. They analyze the 
three phases of market information processing (acquisition, dissemination and usage) in 
different stages of the NPD process. They find that different types of information are 
acquired in different phases of the process (e.g., acquisition of customer information is 
associated with increased use in the development phase only, while dissemination of market 
information is associated with increased use in the pre-development and commercialization 
phases). Their findings suggest that there is a selective dissemination and use of the 
information acquired, although their paper does not investigate the circumstances under 
which the information filtering occurs. The authors seem also to imply that the information, 
whether acquired and disseminated through the organization or directly acquired by the team, 
is fully transferred and used. 
 
 To summarize, existing theory assumes that a mixture of market practices affect 
market information use and finally NPD performance. Figure 1 depicts a market learning 
model adapted from previous work (Lynn et al., 1999; Slater et al., 1995).  There are, 
however, elements missing from both research streams. From the exploratory market learning 
perspective, few studies explore the extent to which new information ―acquired‖ is used and 
implemented. From the market orientation perspective, although some work contemplates a 
selective assimilation of market information, they are not able to explain the circumstances 
under which this phenomenon occurs. One reason could be that with the exception of 
Veldhuizen‘s work, prior research often relies on survey data and usually focuses on 
incremental rather than radical innovation. 
  *** Please put Figure 1 about here *** 
We advance prior work by exploring why and how market information processing may be 
plausibly and purposively filtered and only partially used for concept development. For the 
purposes of terminology, in the remainder of the paper, we use the term ―employing (or 
using) an exploratory market learning process.‖  We assume that firms with high market 
orientation use exploratory market learning processes more frequently than firms with low 
market orientation. 
Market information feedback and internal team values 
The radical innovation literature suggests that new radical projects or technologies often 
emphasize performance criteria the value of which is poorly understood by potential 
customers (Balachandra & Friar, 1997). Customers may thus misunderstand the value of a 
new product. Therefore, even exploratory market information may be of little help, because 
feedback based on this misunderstanding may harm the development process of a radical 
product. Incorporating negative feedback may jeopardize the project by divesting it of the 
potential added value given by its radicality. The product could be stripped of its innovative 
qualities or prematurely terminated. 
 Therefore, managers willing to explore radical concepts need to have a strong 
commitment to reap future profits and critically evaluate the information acquired from 
exploratory market learning processes. Since the benefits that consumers can derive from 
radical new products are unclear, the evaluation of exploratory market feedback becomes 
difficult and it may turn out to be the manifestation of a team‘s beliefs.  Managers facing 
situations characterized by high levels of uncertainty (Gilbert, Mcnulty, Giuliano, & Benson, 
1992) and time pressure (Fiske & Taylor, 1984) can and may bias information processing, as 
they are locked into previously held beliefs and preferences (Biyalogorsky, Boulding, & 
Staelin, 2006; Gilbert et al., 1992). Based on experiments, Schmidt and Calantone (1998) 
find that individuals inflate their perceptions of the chances for new product success for 
radical products compared with incremental ones, causing individuals to become more 
psychologically committed. Therefore, managers may dismiss negative market feedback and 
consider only feedback that confirms their beliefs. Their values and beliefs may ―buffer‖ 
information assimilation and implementation.  
Consequently, understanding how an NPD team assesses market information through 
market learning practices and how this may lead to its dissemination, assimilation and 
implementation or rejection is important to gain a deeper insight into the exploratory market 
learning process.  
 
Our paper attempts to contribute to the market information literature by providing an 
empirical exploration of a longitudinal case study in which market information was 
requested, recorded, reviewed, assimilated or rejected. We examine the case of ―Mitka‖ to 
gain a finer appreciation of market learning processes through feedback assimilation and 
team values. 
 
METHOD AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research project utilizes the longitudinal case study research strategy. The underlying 
rationale is based on some key features well-suited for the purpose of this research study. 
First, it allows investigation of how product innovation unfolds in a real-world environment 
in which decisions actually take place (Yin, 1994).  Second, the case study method is well-
suited for studying the overall picture of the research object as a whole and allows the 
researchers to deeply understand and fully describe the context of the phenomenon under 
study (Dyer & Wilkins, 1991). Other methods, such as survey methods, may get a less 
nuanced picture: survey respondents or interviewed managers may be less accurate, referring 
to a generic rather than particular project. In such a situation, the final picture would reflect 
an ―average‖ of project characteristics (Kessler & Chakrabarti, 1996). Moreover, when asked 
to refer to a particular project, respondents are likely to pick successful projects, resulting in a 
sample biased toward successful ones (Golden, 1992). 
Third, the case study method is an appropriate strategy for enriching or extending 
theory, yet also accommodating existing theories through an iterative process (Yin, 1994). 
The theoretical and the empirical inquiries are not addressed sequentially, but via an iterative 
process that exists between existing theories and data where incongruities are resolved in the 
subsequent iteration (Eisenhardt, 1989). Finally, the method allows the incorporation of a 
variety of different sources of evidence, including archival documents and interviews (Yin, 
1994). 
The unit of analysis at the project level is the most relevant for market learning, 
because managers and teams learn from projects. Moreover, variables that are appropriate to 
explain the differences in organizational abilities in driving exploratory market learning may 
not be suitable for explaining why the level of market learning is higher in one project than in 
another (Kessler et al., 1996). 
 
Case selection 
Qualitative sampling, unlike quantitative sampling, tends to be purposive rather than random. 
The choice of informants, episodes and interactions are usually driven by a conceptual 
question (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  In this particular case, one of the authors had the 
opportunity to step into a project started in The Netherlands in which the objective was to 
design and to develop a new three-wheeled human-powered vehicle, the Mitka (Mitka is a 
Dutch abbreviation that, translated, stands for ―Mobility solution for individual transportation 
over short distances‖). The main motivation to start the project was to provide a radical, new, 
environmentally friendly mobility solution for individual transportation over short distances. 
Although it started as an R&D experiment, the design team and project management soon 
realized that the Mitka could be an attractive product for the market.  Therefore, the Mitka 
project was considered an interesting case study for a number of reasons. 
The first was the context of ―environmentally-friendly‖ product development projects. 
Looking specifically at environmental projects allows us to examine how new concerns are 
integrated into new products and balanced with more traditional ones, such as cost and 
quality. Environmental projects are particularly interesting to analyze because they entail 
environmental concerns that are ill-defined and often difficult to trade off (Berchicci & 
Bodewes, 2005; Chen, 2001). The extent to which environmental concerns should be 
acknowledged in the development of new products given the different perceptions of 
consumers, producers, and governments (Kleiner, 1991) is not clear. The emphasis on 
environmental considerations often creates design challenges in product development.  The 
second reason the project is interesting is that the developers in this case believed from the 
outset that only radical solutions were able to substantially improve the natural environment.  
A third reason is that, from the outset, the Mitka developers decided to use, and had access to, 
relatively sophisticated techniques for soliciting market feedback and acquiring greater 
information to be used in the NPD process. 
Data Sources 
Data collection involved two waves. First, a retrospective approach (following Miller et al. 
(1997) was used to familiarize ourselves with the initial part of the Mitka project when the 
concept took shape from 1999 to 2000. To avoid distortion of past facts, written reports were 
confronted with the outcome of interviews. Since 2000, the second wave of data collection 
consisted of longitudinal research in real time, meaning that the researcher lives with an 
organization over time or carries out periodic interviews (Pettigrew, 1990). In a period of 
more than two years, real-time data were gathered through observation, archival documents, 
meetings, and interviews with key informants. It is important to clarify that one of the authors 
was actively involved in the project when data was collected through market research on the 
Mitka concept and the Mitka vehicle. Therefore, each unit of market information through 
formal market research (focus groups and interviews with lead users, surveys and test trials) 
has been recorded in real time by one of the authors.
1
 
Participant observation. During the period 2001-2003, one of the authors had the 
opportunity to observe the product development of the Mitka project. The researcher engaged 
in 17 formal but unstructured discussions and many more informal conversations with the 
team members regarding technical development as well as market research. Moreover, the 
same author participated in five high-level meetings with the institutional stakeholders in 
which important decisions on product development were made. 
Interviews. Members of the Mitka coalition and other relevant key informants were 
interviewed. 30 semi-structured interviews were performed and lasted from 1.5 to three 
hours. The initial interviews were kept broad in scope in an effort to expose a wide range of 
motivations, decisions and competences. As the research project progressed and the theory 
was refined, interview questions became more focused in an effort to ascribe more details to 
the emerging patterns. 
Archival documents and press releases. The interview data were supplemented with 
information from archival documents and press releases enabling us to crosscheck findings 
                                                 
1
 Data is available upon request. 
2
 For the final category, the acceptance of market feedback, inter-rater reliability was not calculated as it was not 
(triangulation). More than 500 documents such as internal reports, archival information, 
emails, newspaper and magazine articles, etc., were used to confirm the reliability of the 
interviewees‘ responses and permitted directed and detailed probing in the interviews. 
Data Analysis 
The data analysis employed here uses approaches common to qualitative, inductive research 
studies (i.e. Miles and Huberman, 1984; Eisenhardt, 1989). We classified each unit of market 
information and distinct time periods in the Mitka development process. Following the 
method of Cardinal et al. (Cardinal, Sitkin, & Long, 2004), the data analysis consisted of six 
steps. In step 1, a detailed written case history and timeline was prepared along with a 
schematic representation of the main phases and events (as also used, for example, by Van de 
Ven, Polley, Garud, & Venkataraman, 1999). We used a descriptive time-oriented display 
arranging a series of concrete events by chronological time periods in product definition and 
testing, considering the NPD process as a ―deliberate business process involving hundreds of 
decisions‖ (Krishnan & Ulrich, 2001).  The case itself was much richer than the events 
portrayed here. We attempt to give a purposeful yet partial picture of the Mitka case that is 
suitable to analyze the phenomenon under study. 
In step 2, we inductively identified the unit of market information that the team asked 
for, acquired, and evaluated. For example, during a group discussion, a team member 
solicited potential users‘ impressions of the Mitka concept. The piece of information received 
(i.e. ―the design is cool‖) was classified as a unit of information. In step 3, each unit of 
information was classified according to which product attribute it referred to – whether (1) 
product functionality (e.g., the maneuverability of the steering wheels) or (2) product concept 
(e.g., design) and potential usage. In step 4, we classified each unit of information according 
to the potential user‘s desirability of the product attribute. Product attributes were considered 
desirable (i.e. ―the child seat is very convenient‖), undesirable (i.e. ―the rain protection does 
not work properly ‖) and we coded them as positive or negative feedback respectively. In 
Step 5 we classified the unit of information according to their fit into each of the team‘s core 
values. As explained below, the team emphasized two core values: innovation-driven value 
and environmental awareness-driven. Each unit of information was coded as fitting, clashing 
or substantially being neutral with each team core value. For example, from a questionnaire 
at a bicycle fair (February 2001) the design of the Mitka was perceived as innovative and 
―cool,‖ while during a group discussion (March 2001) several users expressed a preference 
for a two-wheel design. The former unit of information fit with the innovation driven value of 
the team, while the latter clashed with it (explained below).  Finally, in step 6 we classified 
each unit of information according to its acceptance by the team, whether the team (1) 
ignored or rejected the information, (2) used and implemented in the concept development or 
(3) kept the unit of information ―on-hold‖ waiting for further information.  
Two coders identified all units of information and classified them according to this 
procedure. The Perrault and Leigh (1989) index was used to estimate inter-rater reliability. 
The estimates show high reliability for three categories coded: product attribute (0.89), 
desirability (0.92), environmental awareness-driven value (0.94), and innovation-driven value 
(0.80).  The first three are excellent, and the latter is not bad, given the fact that for 
exploratory work such as this one, inter-rater reliability is considered low for values under 
0.70 (Perreault et al., 1989).
2
 
Although many decisions were made with the support of all the partners, strictly 
technical decisions were made by the design team while the management team‘s focus was 
mainly on business and market development. The management team comprised 
representatives from a Dutch research institute (TNO, who claimed leadership of the project), 
a Director of the Gazelle Company (a bicycle manufacturing company), a group from the 
                                                 
2
 For the final category, the acceptance of market feedback, inter-rater reliability was not calculated as it was not 
subject to coders‘ interpretation. 
Delft University of Technology (TU-Delft), and a manager from Nike (the athletic apparel 
company). The design team comprised a well-known bicycle designer (Van de Veer 
Designers), the TNO team, an engineering company (Freewiel Techniek), and TU-Delft 
students. In the case developed below, the identity of the actors is kept anonymous and only 
their function within the organization is given for reasons of protecting privacy and as a 
condition of access. 
 
THE CASE OF THE MITKA 
The Mitka was a weather-protected, three-wheeled, human-powered vehicle with an electric 
engine that doubled human pedaling power. It had a maximum speed of 40 km (25 mi) per 
hour and automatically tilted during steering. It was intended as an alternative to a car for 
commutes up to 25 kilometers, as 80% of the car trips made in the Netherlands were for trips 
between 5 and 20 kilometers (Joore, 2000b). The Mitka concept was based on the assumption 
that people would use the Mitka instead of the car and thus would use less energy in regular 
(commuting, shopping, or visiting) transportation. 
The Mitka was seen by most of the participants as neither a bike nor an electric car, 
but rather as a one-of-a-kind means of transport (Figure 2). It was not only the vehicle that 
made the Mitka unique, but also the specially designed services around it. Maintenance, call-
a-car, and leasing services were considered an integral part of the Mitka and made it a 
completely new mobility solution. 
*** Please insert Figure 2 about here *** 
 
The team and team values 
Before embarking on a chronological description and analysis of the Mitka‘s development, it 
is important to describe the Mitka team values. Sharing values within a team is extremely 
important because it allows the team to make decisions and to lead to common commitment 
and action. The Mitka team was heterogeneous, formed by individuals from different 
organizations. Nevertheless, with the exception of Nike, those organizations and often the 
same people within them had participated and worked together in previous projects. The 
design company TNO and TU-Delft ran many projects together (although smaller than the 
Mitka) creating a strong bond among the individuals. Therefore, when the Mitka concept 
took shape in late 90s, the same group of people was formed around it.  What was important 
for the Mitka team? What drove the team in the Mitka‘s quest was a mix of strong belief in 
technology and innovation as a way to solve social and environmental problems.  Put simply, 
we can identify two core values of the team.  These values were mentioned frequently in 
written documents and spoken statements, far more frequently than other potential values. 
1) Innovation. The value assigned within the team to technological innovation was given 
great emphasis. The team believed strongly that technological development could 
create new opportunities beneficial to business and society. Their technological skills 
reflected accumulated behaviors and their technological knowledge and expertise 
were embodied in each team member. Knowledge about vehicle construction was 
embedded in the team. Moreover, the TNO team was able to find individuals with 
skills specifically suitable for the project within the organization. Innovation-driven 
values were formalized in internal reports and often mentioned in discussions within 
the team. 
2) Environmental awareness. Values can be very deep and emotional. The team was 
concerned about the natural environment and believed strongly that technological 
innovation was needed to solve environmental problems. They saw environmental 
issues as opportunities for innovation and value creation. This core value pushed part 
of the team to formalize their belief. In 1997 a formal cooperative agreement was 
established between TU Delft and the TNO team, the Kathalys Program, where 
innovation for the natural environment was the clear mission. 
The innovation-driven and the environmental awareness-driven values led to a strong belief 
that incremental solutions were not enough to solve environmental problems and a dramatic 
environmental improvement could be achieved only through innovative breakthrough or 
radical solutions. This meant also to enlarge the innovation space from products to services 
and infrastructure. As further explained by the project leader: 
 
The present mobility-system based upon the car with [a] combustion engine is strongly 
interwoven with society. Designing only a new vehicle probably will not yield a solution that 
is attractive enough to supersede the car. Moreover, if a solution is sought in new products 
only, in this example [the Mitka concept], these should comply with the current means of 
infrastructure. The innovation space for sustainable solutions then would be unnecessary 
small, and hence the environmental gains possibly lower than could be. Therefore the 
innovation space was enlarged, to include the surrounding system of (infra) structures, 
(organisational) arrangements and services.(Luiten, Knot, & Horst, 2001: 4) 
 
There were also formalized methods and guidelines to help business managers to create 
innovative solutions while addressing environmental concerns.  Their drive for radical 
innovation and concern for the natural environment did not however mean that the team 
would ignore customer needs. They were very concerned about trend-setter needs and lead 
users.
3
 As members of the team said: 
Not only assessing consumers’ acceptance is necessary, but [so is] consumer 
involvement in generating solution ideas. Their expertise on the daily practice 
and underlying values is indispensable for developing appropriate and 
valuable alternatives for fulfilling needs. …[they] should be the first lead 
users of the new [Mitka] system. 
 
The new vehicle needed to be developed according to the needs of these ―lead users‖ (Luiten 
et al., 2001). The focus on lead users was evident through their constant use of market 
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 The team often used the term ―lead user‖ referring to those individuals, e.g., Nike employees, who could 
generate ideas, be involved in the development of the project and finally be the target group of the Mitka. 
Therefore, it does not correspond exactly to the term often used by scholars (Von Hippel, 1986). 
research techniques — some of them sophisticated — to generate and improve the concept.  
The team members shared other values such as passion, for instance, however these did not 
significantly interact with market information processing.  
In a heterogeneous team such as the one for the Mitka development, values follow the 
―imprint‖ of the team leaders (Kimberly, 1987). These core values were embedded in the 
team leaders and shared within the team.
4
  How did these values influence exploratory market 
learning? In the next section we present the case. 
 
Chronological history  
Initiation period: vision and coalition building 
The idea for a new concept in transportation was created over a 3-year period (1998-2000) 
where TNO managers, designers, and scholars discussed the opportunity to develop a 
mobility system for daily commuting that would radically differ from the perceived 
unsustainable dependence on the automobile.  This phase encompassed all the ideas and 
research studies that led both to the Mitka coalition and to its first concept design, often 
called by scholars the front-end phase (e.g. Khurana & Rosenthal, 1998).  
In 1997, a manager from TNO came up with an idea to have a new bicycle concept 
for longer distances than generally covered by normal bike use. The key characteristics of the 
new vehicle, selected by the initial participants through several creativity ―visioning‖ 
workshops, included a speed higher than a regular bicycle (which travels about 18 km/hr), 
power assistance, youthful athletic appearance, resembling a bicycle yet innovative, safe, 
comfortable, and with low environmental impact (Oskam, 1999). Electric power assistance 
was needed to reach speeds of around 30-40 km/hr. 
                                                 
4
 During the development of the Mitka, there was a change of project leader. When the second project leader 
was in place, the former one acted as an adviser. 
Simultaneously, at the Delft University of Technology, several student projects were 
focusing on sustainable solutions for replacing the car for short distance travel. In particular, 
one student project (described in Maas (1998)) used the VIP approach (Hekkert, 1997) to 
develop a new concept for short distance travel in 2005 (this was a method designed for lead 
users to generate ideas). Moreover, to get a first impression of the acceptance of these ideas, a 
concept test was carried out. Abstract sketches were presented to potential future users 
following the Future Conditioning technique (Urban, Weinberg, & Hauser, 1996). The 
concepts encompassed rain-protected bikes as well as three-wheeled vehicles with child 
seats. The final concepts resembled the ―ideal‖ bike: comfortable in all weather conditions 
for distances ranging from 5 to 20 km with a luggage unit or a child seat incorporated. 
Early development: product definition 
To understand the technological, economic and ecological potential of a new mobility 
vehicle, TNO performed two market studies at the European Nike headquarters in Hilversum. 
The first study consisted of several tests lasting for a couple of weeks with different bicycle 
concepts, from regular safety bikes to electric ones and recumbent bikes (bicycles in which 
the rider rides in an almost horizontal position) and three-wheeled vehicles as well. The 
reason was to get feedback and comments on the different bicycles‘ aspects and 
characteristics (Joore, 2000a). The results highlighted that poor marketing and the bad image 
of electric vehicles were the main reasons why these vehicles had limited diffusion. The 
second study was an Internet-based questionnaire given to Nike employees. They were able 
to build their concept with different configurations and product attributes. After those studies 
the team decided to build a 1:3 scale model of a three-wheeled Mitka, with 2 wheels in front, 
which was presented on September 20, 2000, at the Nike European head office in Hilversum. 
At the symposium, the Mitka model attracted the curiosity of many people including 
journalists who reacted very positively to it. In the days following, intense press coverage 
enthusiastically described the futuristic vehicle. The enthusiasm was contagious. The 
coalition was resolute to explore the promising Mitka trajectory. The euphoria boosted the 
Mitka project, which was expected to result in a marketable product in less than three years. 
This proactive attitude translated into a new set of objectives for the following phases: 
the development and test of a vehicle prototype, and later the production of a pre-series of 50-
100 vehicles with dedicated services for a new market (Joore, 2000b p. 7 ).  The main idea 
for the business plan was to sell an attractive package of ―sustainable mobility solutions‖ to 
employers of large and medium corporations. The goal was to reach 1% of the bicycle 
market, which meant 10,000 units per year. The suggested price for the Mitka was fixed 
around €3000.  The design team focused on building a working model and a mock-up model. 
The former was meant to understand the technical feasibility of the three-wheeled vehicle, 
while the latter was to be shown as a ―concept car‖ for feedback from group discussions and 
in-depth interviews with Nike employees and from the general public at bike fairs. The 
feedback was heterogeneous spanning from concept and design to product functionalities. 
The degree of desirability ranged from very enthusiastic to rather skeptical. 
 
Late development period:  prototype stage 
This phase started just as the previous one, with great enthusiasm.  The team had great hopes 
for bringing the Mitka to market. While the design team was working hard during the 
summer of 2001, the perceived increasing value of the Mitka concept raised the stakes for all 
the participants. The general feeling was clearly expressed by the business developer: ―the 
world stands still without the Mitka.” 
The decision to develop such a brand new, environmentally friendly vehicle presented 
both technical challenges for the team and business and market risk for the entire coalition. 
All the work packages entailed completely new design and development techniques, with 
very few standard parts. The team had difficulty coordinating their single developments and 
the whole product architecture. The team‘s limited experience with some of the new 
components and the lack of priority among the product components and their developments 
increased the complexity of the concept. Significant technical problems emerged at the end of 
2001. Resources previously allocated to market research activities were transferred to strictly 
technical product development activities. 
It took eight more months (May 2002), to be able to ride the first Mitka prototype and 
13 months (October 2002) to be able to test the only prototype. The unexpected technical 
problems did not undermine the confidence of the team, although in a memo for the 
management meeting of February 2002, the project leader admitted that the cost to develop 
the first prototype was higher than expected. Moreover, the electric motor was not 
functioning properly and the weather protection was not yet ready. 
Finally, on October 22 the test started with the new Mitka vehicle.  During the test, 
insufficient lighting, poor visibility and poor maneuverability forced the two drivers to drive 
off-peak hours to avoid other bikes along the path.  On the other hand, the sleek appearance 
was highly appreciated by neighbors and relatives of  the drivers. 
On December 5, 2002, the test was stopped prematurely and serious questions 
regarding safety remained unanswered. There was hope that with an effective public 
presentation of the Mitka, the team would be able to raise the capital needed to produce 50 
Mitka vehicles. The occasion for the press conference and the search for potential partners 
and business people occurred on December 12, 2002 where anyone could test the three-
wheeled Mitka on Nike‘s sport track in Hilversum. This event also created a great deal of 
publicity with TV reports and newspaper articles praising the new vehicle as an alternative to 
the car.  Nevertheless, the three-wheeled Mitka project lost some momentum. After three 
years of product development and about €1,150,000 invested, the Mitka project prematurely 
terminated with what could be argued was a barely functioning prototype. 
Despite the cancellation of the project, one spin-off of the Mitka concept, with two 
wheels, was launched in the market in 2003: the Easy Glider, produced by only one member 
of the Mitka consortium (Gazelle). The knowledge of the body and the sitting position of the 
three-wheeled Mitka were transferred to the 2-wheeled vehicle. This bicycle concept, with no 
electric motor, was commercialized and presented to the FIETSRAI in March 2003; it was 
nominated for the ―the best bicycle of the year 2003‖ award, for innovative design and a 
revolutionary relaxing sitting position.  The reaction to Gazelle‘s conduct from the other 
coalitions‘ members was mixed. On one hand, the spin-off of the Mitka project indicated the 
added value of the concept. On the other hand, the behavior was considered opportunistic, 
―betraying‖ the idea behind the Mitka project: an environmentally friendly alternative for car 
drivers. The Easy Glider was considered a rather small step toward a better sustainable 
society. 
 
FINDINGS 
Our case study research provides a context for examining the extent to which market 
information is assimilated and used in radical NPD projects. Figure 3 illustrates the degree of 
compatibility between the unit of information acquired and team values, and the final level of 
acceptance. As shown in the figure, some information units fully fit or clashed with the 
team‘s core values. Some of these information units were rejected regardless of the potential 
user‘s estimate of desirability whereas others were fully accepted. 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate a slightly different result by introducing the type of 
information unit. As shown in these figures, feedback concerning with product concept and 
potential usage are more likely to strongly fit or clash with core team values.   Moreover, 
information about product functionality is more likely to be taken into account by the team 
regardless of the level of the potential user‘s perception of desirability. 
*** Please insert Figures 3 and 4 about here *** 
These results suggests that (1) team values influence the way market information 
acquired is used and implemented, although not so strictly (or simple) as rejecting clashes 
and accepting fit; (2) the use of information depends on the compatibility between the 
information received and team values; and (3) the use of information depends also on the 
type of information and the compatibility with team values.  Let us now examine the 
qualitative results more closely.   
 
Fit-fit 
When the unit of information fit with both of the core team values (the upper-left corner, 
Figure 3), the team fully assimilated it. The users‘ feedback concerned concept attributes or 
potential use of the vehicle. Moreover, it was positive and consistent with team values. For 
example, in workshops, group discussions, or interviews with potential lead users (e.g. Nike 
employees), the unit of information received concerned the innovative design of the vehicle 
and its potential use. In events such as the public presentation of Mitka models the positive 
reaction of the public and press influenced the enthusiasm of the team, increasing its 
willingness to proceed in exploring the promising Mitka trajectory. The team interpreted 
these pieces of information as a confirmation of the value of the concept both for its 
innovativeness as well as for its environmental potential. Using the Mitka meant replacing 
car use with positive environmental effects. The positive feedback also reinforced their belief 
that to fully exploit the Mitka, more radical infrastructure changes around the concept would 
be needed. The project leader affirmed: 
 
“Thinking from existing solutions is not sufficient to reach radical changes. 
There is a need for creative new thinking to generate ideas for fulfilling needs 
in an alternative way. Solutions that are sustainable often go beyond one 
product or one service.” (Luiten et al., 2001: 1). 
 
However, the full assimilation of feedback created solutions that included conflicting product 
attributes. For example, the propulsion system was highly appreciated by Nike employees 
and staff.  The problem was its propulsion power: more speed meant more power that in turn 
required the user to wear a helmet, which was seen as a negative feature as clearly expressed 
by a Nike team member: 
The logo of Nike is “doing the right thing”, and it looks like Mitka is about environment and 
mobility… The Mitka should be very attractive and fun to ride (and it is). The speed should 
be around 40 km/h without a helmet: this is important because the image of Nike is sporty, 
fast, cool, fancy and trendy. If the Mitka needs to be on the road for that reason, it is 
acceptable, but not with the helmet, please” 
 
The problem was solved by introducing two speed modes under the dashboard: a bicycle 
mode, riding under 25 km/hr and a moped mode with the possibility to ride up to 40 km/hr. 
This solution was seen as a compromise, although it clashed with legal regulations when 
riding in moped mode without a helmet, as occurred during the test. From this perspective, 
the team tried to accomplish both goals simultaneously. It was felt that any downgrading 
from the original design would have negatively affected the sleek appearance and the 
environmental intrinsic value of the Mitka. The team members‘ commitments escalated, 
requiring them to work extra hours and over weekends.  The team was emotionally involved 
in the project, both for the innovativeness of the project and for the feeling of ―doing the right 
thing‖ for the natural environment. 
 
Clash-clash 
At the other end of the table (the lower-right corner) market feedback clashed with both core 
team values. The team rejected the feedback regardless of the potential user‘s estimate of 
desirability. Moreover, the type of information concerned, as seen in the previous section, 
dealt with concept and potential usage only.  
An example may make this clearer.  During the pre-development phase, in March 
2000, an Internet-based questionnaire was given to Nike employees. The respondents were 
asked to describe their current mobility situation and to ―build‖ on a computer screen, out of 
individual components, a vehicle that would meet the general set of specifications defined 
earlier by the Mitka coalition and their own preferences as future Mitka users. The 
respondents were able to construct their own ideal product / service system by combining 
elements, like two or three wheels, a rain protection shield, a luggage unit or a child seat. One 
of the central findings from this exercise was the potential users‘ (Nike employees that 
included both bicycle and automobile commuters) preference for a two-wheeled vehicle 
(66%) over a three-wheeled version (33%). Despite these results, in May 2000, the coalition 
decided to develop a three-wheeled Mitka for two reasons. The first one was the appeal of the 
sleek innovative appearance. The three-wheeled concept was considered more innovative 
than the two-wheeled one. The challenging task stimulated the design team as well as the 
management. Moreover, the team was confident that the choice for the two-wheeled concept 
was explained by the conservative attitude of the respondents. The second reason was 
because it was ―better for the natural environment.‖  The new vehicle needed to be attractive 
for car drivers rather than bicyclists. The coalition felt that developing a two-wheeled version 
meant likely attracting cyclists with unwanted consequences for the natural environment. As 
explained by the project leader: “in this way [the three wheeled vehicle] is hoped to 
encourage car users to switch to the Mitka.” Moreover, there was the belief that the three-
wheeled vehicle might encourage a major change in car drivers‘ conservative behavior 
(switching modes of transport). As the designer explained: 
―Making a two-wheeled version meant another recumbent bike, therefore 
nothing new. On the other hand, a completely new mobility solution was 
needed, something really new. It was much more interesting for us as 
designers to make a completely new kind of vehicle than to redesign hundreds 
of bikes”. 
 
Why did the coalition choose a direction contrary to the information available to them about 
what consumers actually wanted? Given the uniqueness of the three-wheeled vehicle, as they 
argued, lead users may not have fully understood the potential of such a concept because it 
was demanding and sometimes prohibitive for them to detach themselves from the current 
transport system. The lead user evaluation contrasted with their internal team values, whereas 
a futuristic three-wheeled vehicle was seen as a forthcoming solution for commuting needs 
with great environmental benefits. The prospect and the high expectations of having a radical 
and environmentally-friendly concept in the market may explain their strong commitment to 
the design. The team ignored this feedback because it was not aligned with their core values. 
 
Fit-Neutral 
In the case in which the unit of information fit with one core value and did not affect the 
other one, the responsiveness of the team to feedback was more nuanced (see the middle-left 
cell in Figure 3). In this case, feedback was predominantly consistent with the innovation-
driven value. Most such feedback was positive concerning both product functionality and 
product concept, and accepted (see Figure 4).  For example, the team chose the configuration 
of two wheels in front rather than in the back because most Nike employees evaluated the 
former as much more innovative and appealing: 
It [Mitka] is related to the company’s culture [Nike]… The Mitka is 
something new and it can be trendy, sporty and attractive for young 
people…. And the choice to have two wheels in front and one behind is 
definitely cooler” 
 
 In another case, during the group interviews, Nike employees wished that the motor and 
batteries were hidden in the chassis for aesthetic reasons. The team agreed to have a fast 
motor and ―invisible‖ battery pack to emphasize the innovative look of the vehicle and avoid 
any analogy with ―uncool‖ electric vehicles.  
With regard to product functionality, the Nike employees often clearly indicated their 
preference for an electric motor that could function smoothly, rapidly assisting the pedaling. 
The team also worked on many of the services proposed by respondents, which were thought 
to be crucial for the success of the Mitka project. For example, the team considered as an 
important service a sort of ―on call repair service‖ for the Mitka users.  
Other reactions were negative, but addressed (accepted). For example, the 
maintenance of the vehicle was an important issue. Many interviewees felt that one of the 
common downsides of bikes, shared also by the Mitka vehicle, was how to keep the vehicle 
clean. As one of the respondents said: 
It would be annoying to clean the Mitka, this one of the reasons why I do not 
bike in the winter, because both the bike and I easily get wet and dirty.  
 
In this case the team worked to reduce maintenance work in cleaning the Mitka by providing 
an innovative cover both for the chain and for the gear mechanism. In addition to that, driven 
by high respondent interest, the team wanted to introduce a maintenance service. One of the 
clear conclusions of the market research according to the market researcher team was: 
From the interviews, surveys and target groups, it emerges that the Mitka 
must be offered including maintenance. The maintenance must be carried 
out …by a special maintenance service. 
 
This unit of feedback fit with their innovation-driven value while being unrelated to the 
environmental awareness-driven value, and therefore accepted. As the project leader said in 
September 2000: 
“The three-wheel vehicle is comfortable in all weather types due to the 
various coverings, it is easy to maneuver and park and it has a modern aura 
about it. An electric motor doubles the pedaling power, so the driver always 
has 'a tailwind'.” 
 
Neutral- Neutral 
When the units of information were neutral regarding the team core values, the results present 
the most heterogeneous responses from the team (see the central box in Figures 3 and 4). 
Regardless of the type of product information, positive and negative feedback was accepted, 
while others were kept on hold for further information. There is not a clear trend or 
significant relationship between the type of information or potential user‘s desirability 
assessment and team acceptance. For example, in the pre-development phase, a clear 
preference for a modular vehicle emerged during a workshop. The potential users‘ idea was 
to have a vehicle that could be easily transformed for different purposes, e.g., having a child 
seat or luggage unit. The team further investigated this solution, but decided not to choose 
this configuration because of technical difficulties and costs. As the designer and market 
research team discussed the topic: 
The child seat is not a priority….What  63%  of potential users wish  is a closed 
spacious compartment [in the vehicle] in which to store valuable stuff… And we 
can include that.  
 
In case of negative feedback, the team tried to address it. When the first prototype was ready, 
the first feedback concerned the difficult maneuverability of the vehicle and the limited 
power of the electric engine. In the test, the lighting was not working properly. As one of the 
test drivers said: 
 “Driving in the dark was dangerous because the lights did not provide enough 
illumination on the road”….About the maneuverability: ―You can feel all the 
bumps on your spine! Moreover you cannot lift your body like on the normal bike. 
It is unpleasant.‖ 
 
The team accepted these negative comments and worked hard to improve the functionality. 
The team also accepted suggestions about the design of specific elements. For example, they 
built a rigid rain protection, replacing the plastic cover, which was not appreciated by 
potential users.  After the test, the above-mentioned remarks convinced the team to replace 
the lighting system and introduce a shock absorption system.  They also started to work on a 
better battery set after a failure: the promised 40 km battery charge did not hold as one of the 
test drivers painfully found out: 
 “As long as the power assistance was working, I was pleasantly surprised by 
the extraordinary speed (28 km max) the Mitka could reach; however, once 
the battery went off, I felt like a loser who was not able to pay for a real good 
vehicle for disabled people. I was as fast as a snail and on little hills I had to 
step out and push it.” 
 
Neutral-Clash 
Finally, when the unit of information was clashing with one of the team values, in this case 
innovation-driven value, the team was ready to listen to and often accepted negative feedback 
regarding product functionality, while often discarding negative concept feedback. Consider 
for example the challenge faced by the team in building a three-wheeled vehicle with an 
upright position. It meant a high center of gravity in combination with the tilting and steering 
mechanism of the two front wheels. With the help of computer simulation, computer 
modeling, and biomechanical models, the project team decided to have the two mechanisms 
of steering and tilting separately adopting a parallelogram construction, that is, the short sides 
of the parallelogram represented by the wheels able to bend (Van Gemert, 2001). The team 
considered this solution highly innovative and unquestionable. With this construction, the 
pedal system needed to be positioned between the wheels in the center of the parallelogram. 
A couple of problems, however, arose with this configuration, namely stability and 
maneuverability: the width had to be around 85 cm to have good maneuverability. Moreover, 
in riding conditions the real width would be wider due to the tilting mechanism.  
As mentioned during the test trial, the vibrations of the fork created serious problems 
for the stability of the vehicle at high speeds. The team was aware of this problem and 
worked to stabilize it. Others, however, criticized the fundamental choice of this 
configuration. The width necessary for the tilting/steering mechanism soon presented a 
practical problem: vehicles wider than 80 cm are unlikely to be stored in a house because it 
may not pass through doors, something emphasized by in-depth interviews with Nike 
employees. Moreover, the Mitka was perceived too large for the bicycle path: 
“The Mitka should go on the bicycle path.  But I foresee some problems; the 
bicycle path is not large enough. You may be a problem for other bikes and you 
cannot pass students that usually drive next to each other”.   
 
 After a couple of days testing the vehicle, the first test driver said: 
 ―It is not easy to pass other bikes. It is heavy to steer and the steering is not 
precise; it was fighting all the way home!.....I have to leave home very early 
and come back at night to avoid other bikers…It is annoying if you are faster 
but you cannot overtake other bikes".   
 
Unsurprisingly, given the strong innovative value attached to this concept, these reactions 
were rejected. According to the team, this innovative configuration was the optimal technical 
solution and there was not much room for improvement. 
The results show also a relationship between the type of information and the phase of 
product development. As one might expect, feedback about product functionality was more 
predominant in the later stages of development, while feedback about the concept was in the 
earlier ones. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The case of the Mitka project gave us the opportunity to investigate the relation between the 
project team values and the way new information was acquired, assimilated and used by 
exploratory market learning processes.  
The decision to start such a project was based on the assumption of combining user 
needs, an ideal mobility concept, with more general societal needs, the preservation of the 
natural environment.  Nevertheless, crucial decisions during the process were only marginally 
influenced by users‘ preferences. Although the team had autonomy, close relations with 
potential users, and was able to employ rich information acquisition practices, qualities 
suggested to foster market learning (Lynn, 1998; O'Connor, 1998), the team only partially or 
marginally assimilated market information. Feedback was selected and interpreted according 
to the core values of the project team. In some situations, the innovativeness of the project 
and by the feeling of ―doing the right thing‖ for the natural environment shaped the team‘s 
decision making process.  
Our interpretation is that the core team values influence the way in which new 
information is assimilated and used, as demonstrated by Figures 3 and 4. If there was 
marginal or no influence of team values we should not see much differences within those 
graphs. These findings reveal how under the surface of exploratory market learning and 
market orientation processes, the team‘s beliefs and its relation with the type of information 
assumes a great deal of importance in making decisions.  On the other hand, if it were simply 
a case of ―ideology‖ or ―escalation of commitment,‖ we would expect that positive feedback 
would be uniformly accepted and negative uniformly rejected. 
Lynn (1998) acknowledges that market learning depends on team formation, although 
it was beyond the scope of his study whether team values influence the way information is 
assimilated and implemented.  Given the uncertainty of exploratory innovation processes, 
managers‘ response to market feedback depends on the extent to which the team is able to 
balance their own values and beliefs with market information. Consistent with the work of 
Veldhuizen et al (2006), we find a selective use of the information acquired. What we add to 
their paper is one of the possible explanations on why this phenomenon occurs — mainly the 
shaping role of team core values. 
The case illustrates the difficulty for the project team to reconcile feedback received 
with its own beliefs. The team‘s decisions could be explained as a result of a recurrent 
dilemma: If market learning processes entail information acquisition, dissemination, 
assimilation and implementation, to what extent and under which circumstances should 
market feedback be ignored, embraced or assimilated? How should one manage one‘s beliefs 
under innovation uncertainty? 
Under market and technological uncertainty, scholars suggest that the NPD team 
needs to evaluate the information acquired (Kohli et al., 1990). There are two issues at stake: 
the ability to process information and the context in which it occurs. First, since decision 
makers are boundedly rational, they ―experience limits in processing (receiving, storing, 
retrieving, transmitting) information" (Simon, 1977).  Besides the manager‘s ability to 
process new information, managers may often purposely filter information. They may give 
different priority to new information received: when information is thought to be important, 
they are more likely to disseminate and use it.
5
 When the information is unlikely to confirm 
one‘s beliefs, the piece of information is likely to be filtered and partially used. Second, in an 
uncertain environment, such as in radical projects, managers lack ―hard‖ numbers in making 
decisions and consequently are more likely to rely more on intuition or rules of thumb. These 
heuristics are more likely to reflect one‘s beliefs, emotional commitments and ideology in a 
NPD project increasing the risk of buffering of new information. 
However, this does not mean that there are systematic confirmation biases (Nickerson, 
1998). Managers are neither systematically overlooking nor fully assimilating information. 
As the case shows, there is a degree of compatibility between team core values and the 
external feedback, rather than a mere consistency between information and prior beliefs as 
suggested by Menon and Varadarajan (1992).  
The degree of compatibility is expressed by a threshold level above or below which 
the information is more likely to be biased by the team. Within these thresholds, managers 
evaluate and investigate the information at hand in an uncertain domain and may classify the 
                                                 
5
 Here we ignore the motivation of the manager to filter information for personal rather than organizational gain. 
piece of information in terms of opportunity, costs, or future returns or other performance 
criteria. Below this threshold, the information is likely to be mainly inconsistent or 
incompatible with the team core values that drive the project. Thus the information is likely 
to be rejected regardless of the type of information or the potential user‘s desirability 
assessment. Above this threshold, the information is likely to be consistent with core team 
values and the team tends to fully assimilate the information acquired. 
What influences the threshold level? Beside the strength of core values, the type of 
information has an important moderating role here. Core values are more likely to be 
―attached‖ to concept product attributes rather than product functionality attributes. The latter 
can be more easily modified and improved according to users‘ preferences. Moreover, in the 
later stage of product development, concept attributes are hard to modify and the team may 
reject any negative feedback to avoid costly changes in terms of time and money. The case 
highlights the importance of the type of information in market learning and market 
orientation processes and advances current theory, since the role of the different types of 
information has not been fully developed in previous research. 
Figure 5 shows a modified model of exploratory learning processes where team 
values act as a buffer between information acquisition and information implementation.  The 
filtering effect depends also on the moderating role of the type of information that affects the 
relation between the team values and the information assimilation. The nature of team values 
and beliefs, the type of information, the extent to which external feedback is solicited and the 
priority accorded it, play a crucial role in shaping decision strategies by information 
assimilation/implementation. Extensive explorative market learning practices may be 
necessary, but they certainly may not be sufficient to benefit NPD performance when team 
core values have strong constrained reasoning power. 
*** Please insert Figure 5 about here *** 
Managerial implications 
Our findings suggest some tentative principles that may inform managerial action. 
These principles involve raising the awareness of the entire ―chain‖ of information gathering 
from collection to assimilation.  First, as radical product innovation implies dedicated 
approaches for managers in gathering market information, our results suggest that the 
information assimilation process requires conscious managerial attention in radical product 
development as well.  Despite the sophisticated richness of the information acquired, 
managers may want to particularly challenge their assumptions about how information is 
ultimately screened, managed and assimilated by the development team during radically new 
product development. This implies greater managerial efforts not only on the upstream but 
also on the downstream of the market information processing. 
Second, it may be important for managers to be aware of biases in the way 
information is processed and to realize that the existence of selective assimilation may lead to 
better product development outcomes. When managers become fully aware of the existence 
of these biases, they may try to investigate the relationship between a piece of information 
and the shared team values. They might be able then to recognize and distinguish when 
market information is fully compatible with their values (which they might have accepted a 
priori) or incompatible (which they might have rejected a priori). This may result in a ―wake 
up call‖ for the team, pushing them to challenge their own beliefs and values when it comes 
to evaluate market information. 
Third, our study highlights that the type rather than (or in addition to) the richness of 
market information may be a discriminating factor in the information assimilation phase. 
Thus managers may want to carefully and critically assess the type of information (such as 
conceptual vs. functional feedback in this particular case) acquired. Doing so, they might 
avoid unconsciously evaluating these different types of information in systematically 
different ways. 
Finally, managers may want to be alert to the ―ideological‖ basis of team decision-
making, as those ideological values, although virtuous and well-meaning as in the case of 
environmental sustainability, could divert or cloud managerial attention from market 
information that may be necessary for the project to be a commercial success.  We do not 
mean to imply that NPD teams should ―sell out‖ out their values simply to achieve 
commercial success, but that it may be valuable to consider feedback that might at first 
glance appear to contradict the values but which actually may in the long run enable the firm 
to produce something that is both acceptable to the market and consistent with the values of 
the team. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Through an in-depth longitudinal case, our work provides evidence of how team values 
buffer new information acquired from being assimilated and used. It allows us to understand 
the extent to which the degree of compatibility between the core values and the new 
information produces different information acceptance outcomes. It also suggests how those 
acceptance levels are moderated by the type of information acquired. These findings provide 
advances toward a more nuanced picture of the processes involving new information and a 
more dynamic theory of market orientation and market learning. 
Having highlighted its strengths does not mean that the paper is without its 
weaknesses. First, the use of only one case study may provide evidence of an idiosyncratic 
phenomenon. Conclusions and generalizations drawn from this study may thus stem from a 
very special case with unique characteristics.  Needless to say, additional cases in different 
organizational settings or industries may strengthen the results. Second, the case selected 
illustrates a project that did not achieve its objectives. One may argue that unsuccessful 
projects are more likely to be influenced by team values. This assumption should be further 
explored and tested with a larger sample of radical projects. Since a great number of projects 
fail (e.g. Crawford, 1977), the (negative) influence of core team values for the performance 
of a project should be seen as a further step toward understanding such project dynamics.  
Third, there were no cases in which an information unit fit with one core value, while 
clashing with another one. Such tension would raise additional questions on how to balance 
core values.  
In conclusion, this paper has taken a first step in understanding the mechanisms by 
which information may be selectively assimilated and used in exploratory market learning or 
market orientation processes.  The above limitations open several opportunities for scholars 
to study the topic of selective assimilation and use in exploratory market learning.  The more 
nuanced description of how radical product development projects evolve is one step in that 
direction. Combined with the importance of radical new product development in 
organizations, we feel this research area will be a fruitful one in the future. 
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Fig. 1 Traditional conceptualization of market learning 
 
 
Figure 2: Mitka vehicle (October 2002) 
 
Figure 3: the matrix of team core values 
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Figure 4: Type of information and its degree of compatibility with team core values 
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Figure 5: Revised model of the market learning process  
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